Аннотации:
The scientific article is devoted to the analysis and rethinking of the category «sanction» in the theory of law and
branch jurisprudence.
As a result of the conducted research, the general theoretical definition of the category «sanction» as part of
a legal norm that provides for negative consequences of non-compliance or improper implementation of the rule
enshrined in the disposition of the rule of law, is supported.
It is noted that, despite the existence of certain terminological differences, in general, the sciences of criminal
law and the theory of law are moving in the same direction regarding the definition of sanctions and their
classification, which cannot be said about other branches of law. In the science of civil law, modern definitions
take us not only beyond the legal norm, but also beyond the law as a whole, focusing on the ability of sanctions to
be contained in the contract between the parties, and therefore associating the sanction not with part of the legal
norm, but with legal responsibility as such. And sanctions in economic law fully relate to the type and degree of
responsibility.
It is concluded that theoretical approaches to the definition of sanctions in administrative law can be clearly
divided into two groups, the first of which «fits» into the general understanding of sanctions. When referring to the
latest doctrinal sources (the second group), there is a significant variability in them and attempts to move away from
the established definition. Moreover, the understanding of the sanction goes far beyond both the legal norm and
legal liability, extending it, among other things, to preventive measures.
Thus, it is necessary to distinguish the category of «sanction» as specifically restrictive measures, as
measures of legal liability and as a structural element of a legal norm. Moreover, if the term «sanction» may
well be applied to restrictive measures, which is due to the etymology of this concept, then the identification
of sanctions as an element of a legal norm and measures of legal liability should be completely excluded. The
use of such categories as synonymous at both the doctrinal and practical levels leads to legal uncertainty and
confusion of concepts
